Psycholinguistic research has shown that people's tacit knowledge of conceptual metaphors, such as ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER, partly motivates how they make sense of idiomatic phrases like blow your stack and flip your lid. But do people quickly access conceptual metaphors each time an idiom is encountered in discourse? The present studies used a priming method to examine the role of conceptual metaphors in immediate idiom comprehension. Experiment 1 showed that people access conceptual metaphors when understanding idioms, but significantly less so when processing literal paraphrases of idioms. Experiment 2 demonstrated that people access the appropriate conceptual metaphors, such as ANGER IS HEAT, when processing some idioms, such as blow your stack, but not when they read idioms, such as jump down your throat, which have similar figurative meanings that are motivated by different conceptual metaphors (e.g., ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR). The findings from these studies provide important evidence on the constraining role that common patterns of metaphoric thought have in figurative language understanding. ᭧ 1997 Academic Press An important idea in contemporary cogni-as our metaphorical concepts for love, play in how people use and understand language? tive science is that metaphor is not just an aspect of language, but constitutes a signifi-There are, at least, four different hypotheses that address this question (Gibbs, 1994): cant part of human cognition (Gibbs, 1994; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987 and love relationships (e.g., Our marriage is off to a great start, Their relationship is at a These hypotheses are not mutually exclucross-roads, Her marriage is on the rocks, sive of one another but reflect a hierarchy of After seven years of marriage, we're spinning possibilities about the interaction between our wheels, and We're back on track again). metaphoric patterns of thought and different What role does metaphoric thought, such aspects of language use and understanding. Several kinds of empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics supAddress correspondence and reprint requests to Rayport some of these ideas. Linguistic studies
An important idea in contemporary cogni-as our metaphorical concepts for love, play in how people use and understand language? tive science is that metaphor is not just an aspect of language, but constitutes a signifi-There are, at least, four different hypotheses that address this question (Gibbs, 1994) : cant part of human cognition (Gibbs, 1994; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & John- and love relationships (e.g., Our marriage is off to a great start, Their relationship is at a These hypotheses are not mutually exclucross-roads, Her marriage is on the rocks, sive of one another but reflect a hierarchy of After seven years of marriage, we're spinning possibilities about the interaction between our wheels, and We're back on track again). metaphoric patterns of thought and different What role does metaphoric thought, such aspects of language use and understanding. Several kinds of empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics sup-support Hypothesis (1) (Sweetser, 1990) , your stack) are used to refer to particular events (e.g., getting very angry). while other research on the systematicity of different linguistic expressions demonstrates Various psycholinguistic evidence supports the idea that metaphors such as a tight link between conceptual metaphors and speakers' presumed understanding of various ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CON-TAINER are really conceptual and not, more verbal expressions as suggested by Hypotheses (2) and (3) (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & John-simply, generalizations of linguistic mean- ing. These include studies that have looked son, 1980). Many psycholinguistic experiments support the claim in Hypothesis (3) that at people's mental imagery for idioms (Gibbs & O'Brien, 1990 ), people's contextmetaphoric thought motivates why many words and expressions mean what they do to sensitive use of idioms (Nayak & Gibbs, 1990; Gibbs & Nayak, 1991) and euphemiscontemporary speakers and also influences people's learning of different linguistic mean-tic phrases (Pfaff, Gibbs, & Johnson, in press), people's folk understanding of how ings (Gibbs, 1994) . However, it still is unclear whether metaphoric thought is accessed in the source domains in conceptual metaphors constrain what idioms mean (Gibbs, 1992 ), people's immediate production and understanding of linguistic meaning (Hypothesis 4). people's use of conceptual metaphors in organizing information in text processing Our goal in the studies we report was to examine whether pre-existing conceptual met-(Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995) , and people's use of conceptual metaphors in aphors affect immediate idiom comprehension. Most figurative language scholars do not drawing inferences when reading poetic metaphors (Gibbs & Nascimento, 1996) . Toview idioms as being especially metaphorical because these phrases are classic examples of gether these psycholinguistic findings lend credence to the hypothesis that different dead metaphors (see Gibbs, 1993 Gibbs, , 1994 for discussions of the traditional view of idiomat-kinds of metaphoric thought partly explain why many metaphors and idioms have the icity). Idioms might once have been metaphorical, but over time have lost their metaphor-meanings they do for contemporary speakers (Hypothesis 3 above). icity and now exist in our mental lexicons as frozen, lexical items. Yet a closer look at Although preexisting conceptual metaphors appear to influence many aspects of how people idiomaticity, one that seeks important generalizations across different idiomatic phrases, re-make sense of idiomatic meaning, some scholars have criticized the conceptual metaphor apveals that idioms do not exist as separate semantic units within the lexicon, but actually proach as a theory of immediate metaphor and idiom comprehension (Glucksberg & reflect coherent systems of metaphorical concepts. For example, the idiomatic phrases Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg, Keysar, & McGlone, 1992; Glucksberg, Brown, & McGlone, 1993 ; blow your stack, flip your lid, hit the ceiling, get hot under the collar, lose your cool, and Kreuz & Graesser, 1991; McGlone, 1996) .
These researchers argue that even though preget steamed up appear to be motivated by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED stored metaphorical mappings may be available, such knowledge may not always be accessible FLUID IN A CONTAINER, which is one of the small set of conceptual mappings between and used in any given context. Under this claim, the above Hypothesis (3) may be true, but not different source and target domains that form part of our conceptualization for anger. Even for Hypothesis 4. One recent set of studies, for example, showed that conceptual metaphors inthough the existence of these conceptual metaphors does not predict that certain idioms or fluence people's judgments of the appropriateness of idioms in different contexts, but do not conventional expressions must appear in the language, the presence of these independent appear to be accessed during immediate idiom comprehension, at least as measured by global conceptual metaphors provides a partial motivation for why specific phrases (e.g., blow reading times for idioms in different metaphoric contexts (Glucksberg et al., 1993) . Although motivating appropriate idioms (e.g., heat which represents ANGER IS HEATED Gibbs (in press) also failed to find a reading time advantage for idioms in contexts that depicted FLUID IN A CONTAINER that motivates blow your stack), or were word that were similar metaphorical conceptualizations, Pfaff et al. (in press) found in a full-phrase reading task unrelated to these conceptual metaphors (e.g., lead). that euphemisms were understood more quickly in contexts that depicted similar metaphors than If people actually access specific conceptual metaphors (e.g., ANGER IS HEATED in contexts that conveyed different conceptual metaphors.
FLUID) during understanding of idiom phrases (e.g., He blew his stack), then this The conflicting findings from this research suggest that global reading time mea-activated metaphorical knowledge should facilitate or prime participants' responses to the sures of comprehension may not provide the best method for assessing whether concep-related targets (e.g., heat) compared to the time it takes people to respond to the unrelated tual metaphors are accessed during immediate idiom comprehension. The main goal of targets. Moreover, people should be faster in responding to the related targets having read the present studies was to employ a more sensitive, on-line priming measure to exam-idioms than when they read either literal paraphrases (e.g., He got very angry) or control ine the role of conceptual metaphors in immediate idiom processing. As we'll point sentences (e.g., He saw many dents). Overall, we expected evidence of an interaction beout in the General Discussion, the evidence that people appear to access conceptual met-tween the type of final phrase (i.e., idioms, literal phrases, and control phrases) and type aphors during idiom comprehension does not necessarily imply that idioms are only of target (i.e., related and unrelated).
The self-paced reading task followed by the understood via conceptual metaphors. It may even be the case that conceptual meta-visual lexical decision task we employed is not the only way to explore cognitive factors phors do not especially facilitate on-line processing of idiomatic meaning. But, for in on-line language processing. For example, psycholinguistic studies that focus on immedinow, our aim is to demonstrate that conceptual metaphors are tightly linked to idioms ate lexical processing often employ auditory or cross-modal priming methods to examine and are often accessed when idioms are understood.
the activation of different conceptual or linguistic information (Cacciari & Tabossi, EXPERIMENT 1 1988; Tabossi & Zardon, 1993) . However, our interest in the role of conceptual metaphors in The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether people access metaphori-processing of complete idiom phrases necessitated that we get some measure that people cal knowledge during on-line processing of idioms. Participants in this study read sim-actually understood these figurative phrases before they responded to the target strings. ple stories, one line at a time on a computer screen, which ended in one of three different For this reason, it seemed most appropriate as a first step in this research program to employ phrases: an idiomatic expression, a literal paraphrase of the idiom, or a control sen-a self-paced reading task in combination with the lexical decision or priming task. tence. Immediately after reading the final phrase and pushing the comprehension butMethod ton, the participants were presented with a letter string and had to decide as quickly as Subjects. Thirty-four undergraduate students attending the University of California, possible if the letter string constituted an English word (i.e., a lexical decision task). Santa Cruz participated as subjects. All of the participants were native English speakers. These letter strings or targets were words that were related to conceptual metaphors Stimuli and design. Fifteen brief stories, av-eraging seven lines in length, were written (Gibbs, 1992; Gibbs & O'Brien, 1990) , along with several words. For example, in the case that described ordinary events (e.g., people lending their cars to other people). These sto-of ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CON-TAINER, we presented participants with the ries were written in a neutral manner and did not provide any specific metaphorical infor-words heat, fluid, and container. The participants were told to select one word that best mation on how the topic of the final phrase should be conceptualized. Each story ended captured the overall meaning of the conceptual metaphor. An analysis of participants' in one of three final expressions: an idiomatic phrase, a literal statement that conveyed the choices indicated that one word for each conceptual metaphor was selected by at least 80% same meaning as the idiom, or a control sentence. All of the idiomatic expressions were of all the participants. We used these words as the related targets in the main experiment. selected from standard idiom dictionaries (Boatner, Makkai, & Gates, 1975 ; Long & The unrelated words were selected by choosing words that differed in meaning, but were Summers, 1979). People were equally familiar with these idioms as determined by a separate roughly equivalent in length as the related tar-
gets. An analysis of the overall frequencies of norming study with 18 UC Santa Cruz undergraduate students. The literal paraphrases the related (M Å 974) and unrelated (M Å 939) target words showed that these did not were taken, in most cases, from previous research that specifically rated the equivalency statistically differ. Finally, in addition to the experimental stimuli, a group of 15 stories of idioms with different literal phrases (Gibbs, 1992; Gibbs & O'Brien, 1990) . A rating study were written that ended with the same three types of final sentences, but which were folwith 14 undergraduate students showed that the idioms and literal paraphrases were gener-lowed by letter strings that did not form English words. Participants were expected to really equivalent in meaning. A list of control phrases was also constructed which fit with spond ''no'' to the targets in these filler stories. Appendix A presents the final phrases the story contexts, but were not similar in meaning to the other final phrases. The three and target words used as the experimental stimuli in this study. types of final phrases (i.e., the last line presented for each story) were roughly equal in All together there were 30 stories, 15 experimental and 15 filler, and these were divided length as assessed by the number of characters in each expression (18.4 for the idioms, 17.5 in a counterbalanced manner into six lists.
Each list contained 5 stories ending with idifor the literal phrases, and 19.1 for the control phrases).
oms, 5 ending with literal paraphrases, and 5 ending with control phrases in addition to the The word targets were selected in the following manner. Previous research in linguis-15 filler stories. For any group of 5 final phrases in a list, either 3 ended in related tartics and psycholinguistics suggested the different conceptual metaphors that motivate gets (and 2 ended in unrelated targets) or 3 ended in unrelated targets (and 2 ended in the 15 idioms used as stimuli in this study. For example, it is widely recognized that the related targets). Across the 6 lists of stories, though, equal number of participants saw conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER partly motivates equal numbers of the same types of final phrases and targets. the idiom blow your stack. Although it is difficult to capture the meaning of an entire metaProcedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the counterbalanced lists of phor by a single word target, we attempted to do this for the conceptual metaphor that partly stories. The scenarios were presented one line at a time on the CRT that was under the conmotivated each of the 15 idioms used as final sentences. We presented 20 UC Santa Cruz trol of an IBM Personal System/2 Model 30 computer system. Participants were asked to students with 15 conceptual metaphors that previously were seen as motivating the idioms read each line of the story as it appeared and to press a designated button as soon as they understood it. When the designated key was appeared in the middle of the CRT (ISI Å 0 ms). The participants were instructed to make a lexical decision response to this letter string as quickly as possible by pushing one of two represented cases in which experimental indesignated buttons on a keyboard. Following structions could not have been followed, as this lexical decision response, there was a de-when participants' attention wandered from lay of four seconds and then the first line of the task. The times to read the last lines of the next story appeared. The stories were pre-the stories and the latencies to make the lexical sented in a different random order for each decision responses are presented in Table 1 . subject. Participants were given eight practice Only reading times and lexical decision times trials before the main experimental session. in which participants subsequently made a The participants were warned in the incorrect lexical decision are included in the structions that they should pay attention to analyses. the stories because at the end of the experiFor both the reading and the lexical decimental sessions they would be asked quession times, two analyses of variance were pertions about what they read. Immediately formed: once treating subjects as a random after the main experimental session, the parfactor while collapsing over materials (F1), ticipants were presented with 32 stories, and once treating materials as the random faceach printed on a card. Half of these stories tor while collapsing over subjects (F2). An and their final phrases were presented in the analysis of the reading times for the three experiment and half were new. The new types of final sentences showed that these varones were close derivations of stories the ied significantly, F1(2,66) Å 7.52, p õ .001; participants already saw. The participants' F2(2,84) Å 3.42, p õ .05. There was no effect task was to correctly recognize the stories of target type, nor was the interaction of target they had just read. No participant failed to type and final phrase significant (all Fs õ 1). correctly recognize 75% of the stories (hits Newman-Keuls tests revealed that the readand correct rejections) and so all the subjects ing times for the idioms were significantly were included in the data analysis. The exfaster than for the control sentences (p õ .05 periment took about 25 min to complete.
across both subjects and items). The differResults and Discussion ence between the literal phrases and the control phrases was not significant (p ú .10 across Reading times longer than 3 s (less than 1% subjects and items). These data are consistent of all responses) and lexical decisions longer with earlier findings showing that idioms take than 2.5 s (less than 1% of all responses) were eliminated from the analyses. These outliers no longer to process than literal paraphrases of idioms (Gibbs, 1980 (Gibbs, , 1986 Ortony, Schallert, in , 1978) .
An analysis of the time it took participants tion, we would not expect priming of the metaphorically relevant word heat because the to make their lexical decisions to the different targets showed that people were faster overall conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER would not be actiin responding to the related than to the unrelated targets, although this effect was only sig-vated; as the phrase blow your stack would only have a literal meaning. We attempted to nificant in the subject analysis F1(1,33) Å 4.37, p õ .001, F2(1,84) Å 1.03, p ú .10. do this in the following study.
In this control study, 24 UC Santa Cruz There were significant differences in the response times to the two targets across the three students read different stories than were used in Experiment 1. The stories in this control different final sentences, F1(2,66) They worked on the big chimneys are lated ones after reading the idioms (p õ .001 across both subjects and items for both com-large factories.
They would scrape the insides with long parisons), but not when they read either the literal paraphrases or control sentences. The poles.
To remove the debris when they were participants were also significantly faster making lexical decisions to the related targets hav-done, they would blow the stack. (literal use of idiom) ing read the idioms than when they read the literal paraphrases or control sentences (p õ vacuum the dirt. (literal paraphrase) get a big truck. (control phrase) .001 across both subjects and items for both comparisons). Finally, analysis of the error rates for the lexical decision task revealed no After reading each final phrase, participants responded to the related and unrelated targets reliable effects.
The results from this study suggest that con-used in Experiment 1. If people were faster making lexical decisions to the related targets ceptual metaphors are accessed during people's normal comprehension of idioms. These (e.g., heat) having read a literal version of an idiom than when they read a literal paraphrase priming effects were found under conditions in which participants were not alerted to the of this idiom (e.g., vacuum the dirt), the results of Experiment 1 may not be due to participants metaphorical nature of idiomatic phrases.
One alternative explanation of the priming inferring the underlying conceptual metaphors of idioms. These predictions follow from eareffects in Experiment 1 is that people should be fast in responding to a related target such lier evidence that the inferences readers draw during reading can be influenced by lexical as heat when they read blew his stack because of their association of one literally blowing priming (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992) .
Before running this control study, we first stacks and the idea of heat, not because people access their metaphorical concept of ANGER asked a different group of 12 undergraduate students to rate the ''naturalness'' of the three IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. This is an important, but difficult, hypothesis final phrases in context. Participants made these ratings on a 7-point scale, with higher to examine experimentally. The best way to test this idea would be to place the same final ratings reflecting their judgments of greater ''naturalness.'' Analysis of these ratings idioms in contexts that induced literal readings of these phrases (e.g., to put blow your stack showed no statistical differences in the means their lexical decision responses to the metaphor targets in Experiment 1 simply because of processing of these phrases' literal meanings. This conclusion makes good sense given for the three final phrases (4.77 for idioms, 5.04 for literals, 4.95 for controls).
that, as earlier studies show (Gibbs, 1980 (Gibbs, , 1986 , people do not ordinarily process the Table 2 presents the data from this control study. Analyses of variance indicated that the entire literal meanings of idioms during their speeded comprehension of these phrases' figreading times for the final sentences showed no main effects or interaction, all Fs õ 1. urative interpretations. 1 Similar analyses on the lexical decision times also showed no reliable effects, all Fs õ 1.
EXPERIMENT 2 Finally, there were no reliable effects in the Experiment 2 provided another test of the error rates for making the lexical decisions.
idea that conceptual metaphors are quickly acThe results of this control study showed that cessed during idiom comprehension. Particithe priming effects noted in Experiment 1 are pants read the same stories used as stimuli in not simply due to activation of the literal Experiment 1. This time, however, the stories meanings of idioms, but can be best attributed ended in one of two idiomatic phrases, both of to the access of conceptual metaphors during which expressed roughly the same figurative people's immediate comprehension of idioms. meaning. For example, a story about a person In a way, the null effects in this control study getting angry because of some event ended in are somewhat remarkable because several either blew his stack or jumped down his lines of research have shown that people often do a ''double-take'' when reading idioms in throat. Immediately after reading the final by a different conceptual metaphor were the inconsistent phrases. Ten of the story contexts phrases in each story, participants made a lexical decision to a related or unrelated target. were taken directly from Experiment 1. These stories ended in idioms for which is was relaThe related target reflected a conceptual metaphor that motivated only one of the idioms. tively easy to find an additional idiom that had a similar figurative meaning but which was Thus, heat reflected the metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER which motivated by a different conceptual metaphor.
As described earlier, these stories were written motivates blew his stack, while the other idiom jumped down his throat is motivated by in neutral manner so as to not provide any specific metaphorical information on how the a different metaphor, ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR. If conceptual metaphors are main topic (e.g., someone getting angry) should be conceptualized. The five new stories quickly accessed during idiom processing, then people should be faster to make lexical written for this study also ended with one of two idioms, again, both of which expressed decisions to the related targets that are consistent with an idiom's underlying metaphor than similar figurative meaning but were motivated by different conceptual metaphors. Across the when they read an idiom with similar figurative meaning but which is motivated by a dif-14 stories, the consistent idioms were 19.1 characters in length and the inconsistent ferent conceptual metaphor. However, when people read idioms motivated by conceptual phrases were 20.9 characters in length. Overall, this study incorporated a 2 (idiom type: metaphors inconsistent with the related and unrelated targets, they should not differ in the consistent and inconsistent) 1 2 (target: related and unrelated) design. speed with which they make their lexical decisions. Once again, we expected an interaction Several norming studies were conducted with the experimental stimuli. Sixteen UC in the lexical decision latencies between final phrase (i.e., consistent idiom and inconsistent Santa Cruz undergraduates rated on a 7-point scale each pair of idioms as to their degree of idiom) and target type (i.e., related and unrelated).
familiarity. The results of this norming showed that overall the consistent (3.81) and Methods inconsistent (3.74) idioms in each story were equally familiar. A second rating task asked Subjects. Thirty-six undergraduates from the University of California, Santa Cruz par-the same participants to judge the similarity of meaning between the consistent and inconticipated as subjects. All were native English speakers, and none had served as subjects in sistent idioms in each story context. These ratings, again given on a 7-point scale, showed Experiment 1.
Stimuli and design. The primary stimuli for that the 15 pairs of idioms were highly similar in meaning with no pair receiving a mean ratthis study were 16 stories that described ordinary events. Each story ended in one of two ing of less than 5.0. Next, we asked, using the same procedure employed in Experiment 1, idiomatic phrases, both of which expressed the same figurative meaning (e.g., ''to get very the same group of participants to chose a word for each new idiom used as stimuli in this angry''). One idiom (e.g., blow your stack) was recognized as being motivated by one study that best reflected the underlying conceptual metaphor motivating that idiom. From conceptual metaphor (e.g., ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER), while this procedure, we found that 80% of the participants agreed on a single word as best reprethe other idiom was motivated by a different metaphorical mapping (e.g., ANGER IS ANI-senting the conceptual metaphor for the different idiom phrases. Appendix B presents the MAL BEHAVIOR). Idioms that were motivated by the same conceptual metaphors re-final sentences and target words for this study.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to flected in the word targets were the consistent phrases, while the idioms that were motivated that used in Experiment 1. phrases for metaphorical statements and their reading-time for understanding idioms in contexts that were consistent or inconsistent with the metaphorical motivation for these idiomResults and Discussion atic phrases. Our research has been conducted The data were analyzed in the same manner in the belief that the previous failures to find as in the first study. Table 3 presents the mean evidence that conceptual metaphors play a reading and lexical decision times. Analyses role in immediate idiom comprehension, inof variance on these findings demonstrated cluding findings from Gibbs (in press; but see that participants took practically the same time Pfaff et al., in press), might be due to the to read the final phrases both when these were methods used to seek such evidence. The allfollowed by consistent and inconsistent tar-visual priming task used in the present studies gets, both Fs õ 1.
provide a good place to seek evidence that Examination of the lexical decision times conceptual metaphors are quickly used in idshowed a significant effect of final phrase, al-iom processing. though this was only reliable in the subjects Our findings show that conceptual metaanalysis, F1(1,35) Å 32.35, p õ .001, phors can under some circumstances be F2(1,60) Å 2.14, p ú .10. The effect of target quickly accessed during immediate idiom type was also significant, but again only in comprehension. This conclusion does not the subjects analysis, F1(1,35) Å 69.26, p õ mean that pre-existing metaphorical concepts .001, F2(1,60) Å 3.43, p õ .10. Nonetheless, are automatically accessed each time an idiom the critical interaction of final phrase and tar-is encountered in discourse. Although people get type was significant in both analyses, may have quick access to conceptual meta-F1(1,35) Å 86.70, p õ .001, F2(1,60) Å 4.62, phors during some aspects of idiom prop õ .05. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that cessing, this does not imply that idiom comparticipants were faster to respond to the meta-prehension depends on the activation of these phor targets having read consistent idioms conceptual metaphors. It could be the case that than inconsistent idioms (p õ .01 across sub-there is a strong association between many jects and p õ .05). The error rates in the four idioms and certain conceptual metaphors conditions also did not differ significantly. without these conceptual metaphors having to These data demonstrate that people do not be computed or accessed as a first step in unquickly access the same metaphorical infor-derstanding what any idiom means. Earlier mation when they read idioms which are studies show that conceptual metaphors partly motivated by different underlying con-clearly help people make sense of why idioms ceptual metaphors even though these phrases mean what they do (Gibbs, 1994) . But it is not as yet clear whether people need to access have similar figurative meanings.
conceptual metaphors in order to immediately interpreting the variety of meanings often associated with more creative or poetic metaprocess idioms.
Second, people may not actually compute phors remains an open question (but see McGlone, 1996) . metaphorical mappings each time they hear or read idiomatic phrases. Thus, people may not Deciding among the above possibilities will require additional research, including studies compute a source to target domain mapping such as drawing an immediate connection be-that assess more micro-aspects of how idioms are understood. There is certainly much more tween heated fluid in a container and the concept of anger when processing blow your stack work to do. In any event, the question of whether conceptual metaphors are actually acor flip your lid. People may only access highly conventional metaphorical concepts that have cessed during idiom processing is only one part of the theoretical concern with metabeen pre-computed, a possibility that makes good sense given that many conceptual meta-phor's role in language understanding. As stated in the introduction, there are several phors are ubiquitous in everyday language and thought. Furthermore, the quick speed with possible roles that metaphoric thought might have in psycholinguistic theories of language which people process idioms compared to literal uses of the same expressions or nonidiom-understanding. A great deal of evidence already exists in linguistics and psycholinguisatic equivalents makes it somewhat unlikely that people are actually computing metaphori-tics showing that metaphor influences the historical evolution of linguistic meaning and cal mappings each time they read or hear idioms in discourse. What contextual conditions provides part of the motivation for why many words and expressions mean what they do for facilitate or inhibit the access of conceptual metaphors in language processing, at what idealized, and actual, speakers of the language. The fact that conceptual metaphors appoint during the moment-by-moment processing of idioms are conceptual metaphors pear to have an essential role in motivating linguistic meaning and psychologically real accessed, and how long does the activation of conceptual metaphors persist when idioms are aspects of language understanding highlight the idea that these metaphors are an important, understood are important questions for future research. One possibility is that conceptual and ubiquitous, part of everyday cognition (see Murphy, 1996; and Gibbs, 1996 , for a metaphors may be accessed at the point when people encounter the key word, or uniqueness debate about metaphor in cognition). No matter what the final outcome on the debate on point, in an idiom, an idea that is consistent with the configuration hypothesis (Tabossi & conceptual metaphors in on-line language processing, psycholinguists must recognize that Zardon, 1993).
Our data do not tell us whether people must the questions of what motivates linguistic meaning, and the evidence obtained that bears compute or access an idiom's underlying conceptual metaphor in order to comprehend what on this question, is an important element in contemporary theories of natural language unthe idiom figuratively means during on-line processing. People's familiarity with many id-derstanding. The data presented in this article suggest that metaphoric thought may, under ioms suggests that they may not necessarily utilize conceptual metaphors to infer idiomatic many circumstances, have a some role in people's immediate understanding of at least meaning each time they hear or read idioms. How people employ conceptual metaphors in some kinds of idioms in everyday language. 
